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The Change in and State of 
Recent Economics 
By John B. Davis 
'Economics has a number of contempo-
rary images: the theory of supply-and-
. demand, Keynesian macroeconomics 
and national aggregate demand management, 
the science of self-interested behavior, ration-
al choice theory, laissez faire and the idea that 
markets should be free and unregulated, math-
ematical formalism, and even the Washington 
Gonsensus on globalization. 
In addition, there are many unhappy things 
people perceive to be true about the economy 
that they believe fairly or unfairly economics 
have brought about: increasing competition 
throughout life, threats to the viability of fam-
ilies and communities, job losses due to rising 
imports, uncertain careers, financial market 
instability, declining personal security, dis-
erimination, and so on. There fewer things 
people perceive about the economy in a posi-
tive way that they attribute to the influence of 
economics, but sometimes they credit eco-
nomics with ensuring near full employment, 
maintaining economic growth, and making 
globalization possible. 
Economists themselves share some of these 
opinions, but as insiders to economics, they 
are far more cautious about the link between 
economics and the economy. While a part of 
economics is indeed about designing policies 
based on economic theory, economists are 
rather skeptical from a professional perspec-
tive about policy effectiveness. That is, they 
recognize that policies can be changed in the 
process of implementation, that they can have 
unexpected consequences, and that they are 
based on limited knowledge about the econo-
my. Where hesitation seems to have been 
lacking on the part of economists is in regard 
to the confidence they have about the accura-
cy and reliability of economic theory. Yet this 
now seems to be changing. This represents a 
fairly new development in postwar econom-
ics, and some reasons why this change seems 
to have come about will follow. 
To begin, it helps to have some sense of the 
development of economics as a professional 
field. As a separate academic domain of inves-
tigation, economics was first established at 
Cambridge University in the last decades of 
the 19th century under the influence of Alfred 
Marshall, with parallel developments occur-
ring around the same time or shortly thereafter 
in other industrializing countries. Of course 
the investigation of economic life long pre-
ceded Marshall's efforts, but the academic 
professionalization of economics served to re-
characterize economics as a science and 
exclude many who lacked the requisite stan-
dardized training from effective participation 
in the discussion of economic issues. 
A next important development for econom-
ics was the Great Depression, which led to a 
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change in the public view of the prerogatives 
and responsibilities of economics and econo-
mists vis-a.-vis the economy. The aggregate 
demand management economics of John 
Maynard Keynes-later called Keynesian 
economics-was generally accepted by econ-
omists and the public by mid-century as being 
successful in maintaining high levels of 
employment and production, and economists 
were thus expected to act on the policy front 
when economies suffered, and seen as legiti-
mately qualified to do so. 
A third important development was World 
War II and the postwar mathematization of 
economics. The war created massive materiel 
and personnel management problems that 
required new quantitative tools. Economists 
borrowed liberally from physics, engineering, 
and operations research to develop these 
tools, and then carried them forward in the 
postwar to the analysis of markets and eco-
nomic systems. The postwar period also saw 
tremendous resources devoted to the develop-
ment of university research faculties across 
the sciences-partly driven by the Cold War. 
This had the effect of multiplying the number 
of professional economists with mathematical 
training many times over, thus creating a large 
identifiable academic-governmental con-
stituency with generally high public approval 
associated with the perceived performance of 
economics in the Depression and the War. 
Moving toward the present, our current 
understanding of the world pivots on the fall 
of ':he Berlin Wall in 1989. A change in the 
status of economics seems to share this same 
dat,~. One thing the Cold War did to econom-
ics (with the exception of the Vietnam period) 
was drive out difference of opinion about its 
subject matter. The technical assistance of 
economists in the war effort promoted mathe-
mad cal modeling in economics after the war, 
which drove out more qualitative approaches, 
plm diversity in general. Economics standard-
ized itself around neoclassical theory and sys-
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tematically cleaned house by denying paths to 
professionalization to individuals interested in 
non-standard and heterodox approaches to the 
field. Minus the Wall, however, the standardi-
zation of economics seemed less compelling. 
At the same time, dramatic change in the 
world's economy associated with its increas-
ing integration or globalization raised the 
question of economics' flexibility and com-
prehensiveness. What then has happened, 
then, to economics in the last quarter century? 
Recent economics can be described as a 
traditional neoclassical core surrounded by 
two sets of approaches that challenge it: (a) 
heterodox research programs (many of them 
long-standing, others more recent) that have 
survived the standardization process, and (b) a 
collection of new research programs which 
largely derive from the influence of other sci-
ences on economics. The former include insti-
tutional economics, Marxist economics, radi-
cal political economy, social economics, fem-
inist economics, Post-Keynesian economics, 
and neo-Austrian economics. The latter 
include behavioral economics, game theory 
(in various forms), experimental economics, 
evolutionary economics, and complexity eco-
nomics. 
Neoclassical economists generally ignore 
both sets of approaches but are increasingly 
aware that the standard view of economics is 
under challenge from many directions. There 
is also criticism of economics by those who 
consider themselves neoclassical, led by a 
number of leading economists who are either 
dispositionally open to change in economics 
or who have their own complaints against 
neoclassicism. Thus the old confidence econ-
omists exhibited in the first two or three 
decades after the war about the state of eco-
nomic theory now seems to be somewhat 
weakened. This is not to say that econo~ists 
who follow standard theory anticipate its 
demise. Rather it is more a matter of an 
increasing concern that the challenges to the 
standard approach in many instances go 
directly to its heart ... and may be right. Let 
me identify some of these challenges, as well 
as those who are responsible for them. 
Most important of all is the critique of 
rationality and rational choice. Neoclassical 
economics has come to be seen by many as 
the theory of rational choice, whereby indi-
viduals make optimal choices for themselves 
based on the prices they face and their person-
al preferences. Other people's desires and the 
different circumstances in which choices are 
made are said to not influence the individual's 
decision. Prices create clear incentives for 
self-regarding individuals, and individual 
behavior maximizes individual utility, or 
makes the individual as well off as possible. 
That individuals choose rationally is also the 
foundation of the claim that markets work 
efficiently, that is, that left to operate freely 
they make everyone better off (putting aside a 
small number of cases generally agreed to 
represent exceptions). 
But there is now considerable empirical 
evidence from psychology that individuals do 
not choose rationally. Economists have histor-
ically assumed that individuals choose ration-
ally and marshall a variety of thought experi-
ments to motivate this assumption. But psy-
chologists since the 1970s, in an empirical 
subfield called behavioral decision research, 
have run actual experiments that consistently 
demonstrate that individuals do not behave 
rationally. In particular they show that indi-
vidual decision-making is reference-depend-
ent, meaning that the circumstances in which 
people make choices have anchoring effects 
on those choices. Thus how a question is 
posed influences the choice a person makes. 
Moreover, people seem to be rather poor at 
making certain kinds of choices in which con-
siderable information processing is required, 
especially with respect to estimating probabil-
ities as are associated with choices concerning 
future events. What psychologists have conse-
DAVIS 
quently argued is that people use a variety of 
cognitive devices to help them frame their 
decisions. This has been articulated as the 
heuristics and biases program, associated with 
the influential research of Daniel Kahneman 
and Amos Tversky, and now an active field in 
economics called behavioral economics. 
Economists have not been able to avoid 
becoming acquainted with this research, since 
Kahneman received the Nobel Prize in 
Economics in 2002, despite not being an 
economist. (Tversky would likely have shared 
the Prize but was deceased.) 
Thus a key foundation of neoclassical eco-
nomics, rational choice, has been strongly 
challenged. Further, it has been challenged not 
simply as a scientific tenet, but also at the 
level of its methodological foundations. John 
Stuart Mill, a half century before Alfred 
Marshall, argued that economics is primarily a 
deductive science or a special kind of logic. J 
Unti'! the rise of econometrics after World War 
II, economics' credentials as an empirical sci-
ence have been thin at best, while economet-
rics-the statistical analysis of equations rep-
resenting economic relationships-has never 
really tested the economic behavior underly-
ing those relationships. Thus it was something 
of a shock to the economics profession when 
Kahneman and Tversky and their colleagues 
not only demonstrated that one empirically 
could test individual choice behavior, but that 
the experiments in which this was done could 
be extensively replicated. Economists had 
always argued that experiments could not be 
done in economics on the grounds that one 
could not isolate and scientifically control a 
piece of the economy and run experiments on 
it. But the psychologists had a long tradition 
of isolating individuals in laboratories and 
testing their behavior. For them it was a minor 
development of their science; for economics it 
was a significant development, and, more-
over, one disruptive of long-established think-
mg. 
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A second key challenge to neoclassical eco-
nomics was to the concept of equilibrium. The 
idea of an equilibrium state is the idea of the 
economy, or a part of it, settling into a condi-
tion in which there are no forces acting to pro-
duce change. It is also the idea that the econ-
omy tends to settle to natural resting places in 
which the different plans and behavior of 
countless different individuals is harmonized. 
The classic example is the balance of supply 
and demand. As a price rises, supply rises and 
demand falls; as a price falls, demand rises 
and supply falls. Economists argue that prices 
will fluctuate until the amount demanders 
want is exactly equal to the amount suppliers 
offer, and the market clears. The doctrine 
underlies the laissez faire prescription econo-
mists see as their default policy position and is 
the basis for the idea that economists general-
ly favor free trade in markets. 
The situation with the equilibrium concept 
in economics is a little more complicated than 
the situation with the rationality concept. A set 
of very technical results in the 1970s in the 
theory of the economy as a general equilibri-
um of markets-known as the Sonnenschein-
Mantel-Debreu results-demonstrated that 
two of the main properties universally agreed 
to be part of the concept of an equilibrium, 
namely, that it is unique and stable, were 
impossible on the standard foundations. By 
most accounts, this led to economics' general 
abandonment of the notion that the economy 
could be represented as one large general 
equilibrium of markets, and the substitution of 
an tmtirely new approach developed in math-
ematics called game theory. 
Game theory was created explicitly for eco-
nomics in the 1940s by John von Neumann 
and Oskar Morgen-stern. So in trouble on a 
foundational concept, economics turned to 
mathematicians. Indeed they soon substituted 
a new concept of equilibrium for use in game 
theory that came from another mathematician, 
John Nash (also later a Nobel Prize winner in 
10 
economics). Unfortunately, it was soon deter-
mined that equilibrium in this new game the-
ory framework suffered one of the same fail-
ures as general equilibrium theory: it could 
not be shown to be unique. Thus economics 
found itself with the idea of the economy set-
tling to some equilibrium state of affairs but 
could not determine which state of affairs it 
was! 
In the economics of the last quarter centu-
ry, then, two new initiatives have come for-
ward as proposals regarding how this situa-
tion might be sorted out. Again, both come 
from outside of economics, one from evolu-
tionary biology and the other from physics. 
Evolutionary biology came into economics 
when a small group of economists remodeled 
games as contests between different types of 
players in evolutionary settings. The popula-
tion frequencies of these different types of 
players were considered equilibrium out-
comes, and these outcomes could be shown to 
have a number of desirable, expected proper-
ties associated with eqUilibria. However, since 
the players in these evolutionary games were 
now types of individuals---or species in effect 
-the price at which this re-elaboration of the 
equilibrium concept was achieved was the 
removal of particular individuals from eco-
nomic analysis. In evolution, individuals do 
not survive; species do. It may well be of 
course that economics in the long run is about 
the survival of kinds of economic agents 
rather than about individuals as economic 
agents. But this means it has little to tell us 
about ordinary day-to-day decision-making in 
economies in the short run. Presumably most 
people expect economics to have something 
to say about this too. 
Physics (or rather physics, a number of 
other physical sciences, some of the computa-
tional sciences, and a number of other fields) 
has also had an impact on thinking about equi-
librium in recent economics in influencing 




complex adaptive system. In general, the 
emergence of complexity theory in recent 
years is due to advances in computing power 
that have made it possible to simulate large 
complex systems of different relationships 
with multiple confounding feedback patterns 
that cannot be solved with traditional analyti-
cal methods. Simulations run over many peri-
ods and may exhibit phase transitions and 
emergence in which formerly undetectable 
aggregate phenomena suddenly become man-
iH~st. 
In economics, complexity thinking begins 
with the idea of collections of heterogeneous 
individuals or agents who directly interact 
with one another. An important subject of 
investigation is network effects, or how con-
c1entrations of interrelated individuals display 
shared characteristics that have varying 
impacts on their individual behavior. Many of 
these new models are quite interesting, but 
they often have some very untraditional 
results for standard economics. One is that 
equilibria may either not exist or be transitory. 
An economy may move through a number of 
only temporary resting points that are unsta-
ble. Thus economics' long attachment to the 
equilibrium concept may ultimately go by the 
wayside. 
This also has implications for that standard 
concept of the individual. If the economy 
never really settles into one state or another, it 
may not make sense to say that individuals 
ever maximize anything. They might rather be 
seen as continually sorting through a variety 
of different strategies as appropriate to the 
changing circumstances they encounter, never 
a.::hieving anything that might be termed a 
best state of affairs. 
Thus both rationality and equilibrium, 
mainstays of postwar standard neoclassical 
economics, have an uncertain future in eco-
nDmics. This is not to predict that economics 
will undergo significant change in the future 
or that these concepts will disappear. But they 
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no longer have the same unchallenged posi-
tion in the field they had in the three decades 
after the War. We might say, then, that eco-
nomics is becoming more pluralistic, and per-
There is now an entire field of inves-
tigation in economics called experi-
mental economics. 
haps more decentralized with a larger number 
of research strategies being pursued, not all 
neatly covered by one large umbrella view of 
economics. In addition to the developments 
discussed above, five more deserve mention, 
three of which were also associated with indi-
viduals awarded Nobel Prizes in Economics. 
First, there is now an entire field of investi-
gation in economics called experimental eco-
nomics. Having long denied experiments 
could be carried out in economics, now a sig-
nificant number of researchers in the field are 
carrying them out. Many deny that individuals 
must always be seen as rational. For example, 
Vernon Smith (also an Economics Nobelist in 
2002) allows that individuals may act for a 
variety of reasons, but sees the market process 
as ultimately driving individuals to efficient 
market behavior. He thus decouples the stan-
dard neoclassical view that rationality and 
efficient markets in equilibrium go hand in 
hand, in order to preserve the idea that mar-
kets tend to produce efficient equilibrium out-
comes. Further, his conclusions are the result 
of numerous market experiments run by him 
and his colleagues. Whereas economists pre-
viously argued in deductive fashion that mar-
kets settle to equilibrium, Smith succeeded in 
showing this to be an empirical result. 
Second, as the 2007 Nobel Prize shows, 
there is an active new field in economics 
called market design. Market design econom-
ics investigates the institutional structure and 
pricing mechanisms of efficient markets and 
then develops strategies for reforming exist-
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ing markets that are inefficient and creating 
markets that would be efficient where they do 
nOl: exist. An example of reforming an ineffi-
cient market is the design of applicant-vacan-
cy matching algorithms or procedures for 
medical residents. An example of a created 
market was the design of auctions for the U.S. 
Federal Communications Commission grant-
ing of access rights to the electromagnetic 
wa ve length spectrum. 
One remarkable thing about market design 
economics is that it abandons the traditional 
assumption in economics that markets are nat-
urally competitive and should be left free and 
umegulated. In market design economics, in 
contrast, the idea is that markets often need to 
be constructed in order to work freely. 
AnJther thing that is interesting about market 
design economics is its recourse to experi-
mental research in the laboratory. Possible 
institutional arrangements for markets are 
first tested in the lab before being tried in the 
real. world, so again deductive investigation is 
not enough. 
A third new area of investigation in eco-
nomics is neuroeconomics. Neuroeconomists 
use brain-scanning techniques from neuro-
scit:::nce to investigate how the mind functions 
when individuals engage in economic behav-
ior in laboratory situations. For example, in 
some experiments, individuals play a game 
involving bargaining, and researchers then 
examine their brain activity to determine 
which centers of the brain are active. The 
standard view is that decision making 
involves the prefrontal cortex or the "think-
ing" part of the brain. But there is consider-
able' evidence showing that areas of the brain 
associated with emotional response, or affect, 
play important roles when individuals find 
themselves in bargaining situations. This rais-
es general questions about human ability in 
decision making. If people do not always 
make decisions rationally, they may not make 
always make decisions that are in their best 
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interest, as for example when they decide how 
much to contribute to voluntary pension sav-
ings plans. There may then be an argument for 
public policy initiatives that set default 
options for such programs that would be in 
individuals' best interests. 
A fourth new development in economics is 
capabilities research, inspired by the work of 
Amartya Sen, also a Nobel Prize winner in 
economics. Capabilities are freedoms to exer-
cise various capacities or functionings we 
have. Thinking of individuals in these terms is 
a departure from the standard view that indi-
viduals are utility maximizers, where this is 
usually understood in terms of preference ful-
fillment. Preferences are always given on the 
standard view, but the exercise of capabilities 
involves the development of individual capac-
ities or functionings. This leads to an entirely 
ditferent view of individual well-being and 
has resulted in the construction of a number of 
new types of indices to measure progress in 
developing individual capabilities. For exam-
ple, the United Nations Human Development 
Programme uses the Human Development 
Index to determine different countries' 
progress in promoting the achievement of 
higher levels of basic human capabilities. This 
has important implications for public policy 
in developing countries and indeed for policy 
in developed countries as well. The capabili-
ties concept's adoption by economists was 
largely inspired by philosophical influences 
on economics. 
Fifth, a new view of the concept of individ-
ual preference is called the social preferences 
approach. Much experimental work in eco-
nomics investigates individual behavior in 
game theory settings. The standard neoclassi-
cal prediction is that people would generally 
act in a self-regarding way in these experi-
ments. But one result of game theory experi-
ments is that people are also motivated by 
social preferences-altruism, fairness, and 
reciprocity-and that these motives may 
dominate self-interest. The most famous 
experiment is the ultimatum game in which 
one player is given a sum of money and may 
decide to give some of it ~o a second player. If 
the second player accepts, the distribution is 
made, but if the second rejects the offer, nei-
ther get anything. Self-interest predicts that 
"(he first player offers the smallest possible 
amount, and the second player accepts this. 
But the evidence consistently shows that larg-
I!r amounts are offered, and very small 
amounts are rejected. Thus people have social 
preferences, or preferences concerning their 
relations to others, and the traditional Homo 
economicus view of the individual seems lim-
ited in what it can explain. 
Thus, despite the fact that economics is still 
largely identified with standard neoclassical 
economics, there is considerable change in the 
field, particularly on the research frontier. 
Much of this change, moreover, is inspired by 
influences of other sciences on economics. 
Sciences, of course, are distinguished by their 
Hubject matters, but they also typically have 
different practices of investigation and 
methodologies of explanation. Thus as new 
concepts and ideas come into economics from 
other fields, they often import along with 
them new ways of conceptualizing investiga-
tion in economics. Game theory and experi-
mentalism are two prime examples of this. 
Neither methodology existed in economics 
until the postwar period, and together they 
have created a range of new strategies for 
explaining markets and economic behavior. 
From the point of view of non-economists, no 
doubt many of these kinds of changes appear 
t~soteric and unrelated to everyday concerns 
regarding the functioning of markets and 
tmtire economies. Moreover, societies seem 
most concerned with economics as regards 
t!conomists' policy recommendations. Policy 
targets changes in the ways economies work, 
but it need not be accompanied by theoretical 
explanation. Debates over economic policy 
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concern impact, and rarely do non-economists 
debate impact in terms of theoretical distinc-
tions. That they leave to the economists, so 
that change in the foundations of economic 
policy generally occurs, as it were, behind the 
scenes. 
In addition, economics as a science is in an 
unusual position with respect to the nature of 
its policy prescriptions as compared to many 
other sciences. A science's policies can be 
looked at in two ways: how great their impact 
is, and how precisely they are able to target 
their object. For economics, impact is often 
high since many people's lives can be affect-
ed by economic policies in significant degree. 
But, as noted at the outset here, economists 
are aware that economic policy may not 
achieve its objectives, because policies can be 
changed in the process of implementation, 
they can have unexpected consequences, and 
they are based on limited knowledge about the 
economy. Thus the general situation for eco-
nomics is that things can go wrong, and some-
times in a serious way. This by itself is enough 
to make economists cautious about the claims 
of economics in explaining the economy. But 
the change in recent economics has added 
another reason for caution. No longer does it 
seem that economics as a science is complete 
and mature, as many believed in the first three 
decades after World War II. Now it is increas-
ingly recognized that there is on-going 
change, debate, and key theoretical challenges 
afoot, reducing confidence regarding how 
secure economic theory should be thought to 
be. Perhaps the response to this will be to keep 
debates in-house. Then, should a new consen-
sus emerge in the future about the nature of 
economic science, economics may re-appear 
as a unified science .• 
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